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entity; and (iii) Responding to threat: Anti-Zionism as a religious duty for the Muslim 
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Representing the ‘Zionist Regime’: Mass communication of anti-Zionism in the 
English-language Iranian Press 
 
Rusi Jaspal, Ph.D. 
De Montfort University, Leicester, UK 
 
Anti-Zionism constitutes an important ideological building-block of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (IRI). Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, anti-Zionism became an official policy 
in Iran and diplomatic relations with the State of Israel were suspended (Mahdi, 2003). The 
IRI vocally supports Palestinian sovereignty over the whole of present-day Israel, the West 
Bank and Gaza, while periodically calling for the destruction of the Jewish State. This 
position has drawn support from other Arab and Muslim countries, and condemnation from 
much of the Western world (Takeyh, 2006). There has been social sciences research into the 
development and deployment of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in the IRI (Jaspal, in press; 
Litvak, 2006; Shahvar, 2009), much of which has examined the political functions of this 
ideological stance (Küntzel, 2010; Takeyh, 2006). This paper makes a novel socio-
psychological contribution to the literature by examining textual social representations of 
Israel in the Iranian Press. More specifically, the paper investigates how the IRI’s anti-Zionist 
policy is ‘exported’ beyond the national and linguistics borders of Iran through a critical 
discourse analysis of a small sample of articles published in the English-language Iranian 
Press. 
 
Institutionalised social representations of Israel 
Zionism can be described as an ‘ethnonationalist ideology’, whereby Israel is regarded as ‘the 
expression of the Jewish people’s right to national self-determination (Beller, 2007, p. 226). 
Conversely, the IRI regards Zionism as a racist and oppressive ideology, which it likens to 
Nazism (Takeyh, 2006). Since the IRI withdrew its recognition of the State of Israel 
following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, it has systematically referred to Israel as the 
‘Zionist regime’ and ‘Occupied Palestine’. It regards Israel as an occupation of Palestine, 
which is frequently depicted as ‘Muslim land’ (Shahvar, 2009). The IRI is a major funder of 
the Hezbollah Movement in the Lebanon and of the Islamist party Hamas in the Palestinian 
Territories, both of which are regarded as terrorist organisations by the US and the EU and 
are committed to the destruction of the State of Israel (Palmer-Harik, 2004).  
Social scientists have examined the nature of social representations disseminated by 
the IRI, particularly in political and media discourses (Jaspal, in press). Indeed, given the 
censorship of the media in Iran, political and media discourses tend to be mutually 
complementary, which is likely to produce coercive and uniform social representations. In his 
account of the motives underlying anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in Iran, Jaspal (in press) 
has argued that the IRI deliberately disseminates anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic social 
representations in order (i) to maintain temporal continuity between the original tenets of the 
Islamic Revolution and the present-day Islamic Republic; (ii) to establish a sense of 
acceptance and inclusion in the largely Sunni Muslim Middle East; (iii) to exhibit the 
competence, influence and control of the IRI vis-à-vis Jews and Israel; (iv) to construct Israel 
as a threat which needs to be defeated by the Muslim world. However, it is important to 
examine how these motives are served by Iranian English-language media representations. 
 
Media representations of Israel 
Much existing research into the media in Iran tends to focus on media practices, journalistic 
tendencies, press censorship and the long-standing anti-Western position of the Iranian media 
since the Islamic Revolution (Semati, 2008; Sweetser & Brown, 2010). Yet, there have been 
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only cursory observations concerning how Jews and Israel are represented in the Iranian 
media in order to exemplify general points concerning institutionalised anti-Semitism and 
anti-Zionism in Iran (Litvak, 2006; Shahvar, 2009; Takeyh, 2006). This work has been useful 
in elucidating the relationship between political and media discourses in Iran and how the IRI 
disseminates its anti-Zionist ideology to the Iranian readership. However, there have been 
few systematic media analyses focusing specifically on how the English-language Iranian 
Press represents Israel. This is key to understanding how the IRI ‘exports’ its anti-Zionist 
ideology to an international readership in order to broaden its sphere of ideological influence 
beyond the national boundaries of Iran.  
 Klein’s (2007) analysis of how the Iranian and Israeli media represented the Iranian 
nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during a two-month period in 2007 is a 
notable exception. Using a small purposive sample of online articles, Klein examined the 
‘news frames’ employed in Iranian and Israeli media reporting, respectively. It was found 
that the Iranian Press typically framed Israel as a ‘savage regime’ and enemies of Islam. 
However, Klein’s period of analysis was dominated by a speech delivered by Iran’s Supreme 
Leader concerning the International Qods Day, the annual Islamic ‘resistance day’ celebrated 
on the last day of Ramadan, which could explain these results. Conversely, the present study 
focuses upon more habitual representational practices in order to elucidate how Israel is 
represented to an international readership in the absence of politically ‘polarising’ events. 
Furthermore, it is concerned explicitly with the creation of meaning in the media, that is, how 
social representations of Israel are actually created, disseminated and encouraged in media 
reporting. Crucially, it offers a socio-psychological approach to textual social representations 
of Israel, bridging representation, identity and action. Social representations theory provides 
an ideal heuristic lens for this purpose. 
 
Social Representations Theory 
Social representations theory (Moscovici, 1988) was designed to address human responses, 
both cognitive and rhetorical, to scientific information, by treating seriously the information 
that circulates in society and the ideas in people’s minds (Billig, 1988). A social 
representation is defined as a system of values, ideas and practices regarding a given social 
object, as well as the elaboration of a social phenomenon by a group for the purpose of 
communicating and behaving. Social representations of Israel in the media provide the 
readership with a shared social ‘reality’ and ‘common consciousness’ vis-à-vis Israel, 
facilitating meaning-making and ‘appropriate’ social and psychological responses to it 
(Klein, 2009).  
In his analysis of how representations are formed, Moscovici (1988) outlines the 
processes of anchoring and objectification. Anchoring reflects the categorisation of 
unfamiliar objects through their comparison with an existing stock of familiar and culturally 
accessible objects. For the readership to develop an understanding of Israel, it must first be 
named and attributed familiar characteristics, which facilitate communication and discussion 
about it. For instance, Shahvar (2009) has observed that the Iranian Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini frequently linked the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Jews’ historical 
‘exploitation’ of Muslims, thereby constructing Israel as the ‘villain’ in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Objectification is the process whereby unfamiliar and abstract objects are 
transformed into concrete and ‘objective’ common-sense realities. Jaspal (in press) has 
argued that, for the IRI, Israel is a tangible symbol of Jewish self-efficacy, that is, their 
autonomy, competence and control. A critical discourse analytical approach to anchoring and 
objectification can elucidate how these processes function discursively in the domain of text 
and talk (van Dijk, 1993). 
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 Social representations are shared and accepted by individuals to differing degrees 
(Moscovici, 1988). Hegemonic social representations are shared consensually by members of 
a group; they are coercive and relatively uniform. The illegitimacy of the State of Israel can 
be considered a hegemonic social representation in the Middle East (Kressel, 2007). 
Conversely, polemic representations are generated in the course of social conflict and are 
characterised by antagonistic relations between groups. Typically, polemic representations 
challenge existing hegemonic representations. The theory that the Zionists deliberately 
accentuate the number of Jews killed during the Holocaust could be described as a polemic 
representation (Litvak, 2006). Moving beyond social representations, certain ideas regarding 
Israel and Jews may in fact constitute nexuses, which refer to indisputable ideas and symbolic 
emblems that correspond to ‘prelogical affective knots shared by a large number of 
individuals’ (Rouquette, 1994, p. 60).  Nexuses differ from social representations in that they 
constitute ‘a more narrow, more radical, more collective and more mobilising modality’ with 
important implications for social behaviour (Ernst-Vintila, Delouvée & Roland-Lévy, 2011, 
p. 297). Moreover, Cinnirella (1997) has argued that social representations can become 
dormant over time, although the interaction of social and psychological factors can re-
activate them. Clearly, social power plays an important role in determining whether social 
representations are to remain active or become dormant and whether they are hegemonic, 
polemic or more akin to a nexus; power relations determine the influence a group has in 
disseminating and ‘hegemonising’ its representations (Breakwell, 2001). This paper 
investigates how polemic representations can be ‘hegemonised’ in media discourse. 
 
Aims 
This study examines (i) how the processes of anchoring and objectification are employed in 
media discourse in order to generate particular social representations of Israel; (ii)how 
polemic representations of Israel are consolidated; (iii)the implications of these 
representations for intergroup relations. 
 
METHOD 
Critical discourse analysis 
This study presents a fine-grained critical discourse analysis (CDA) of a small corpus of 
articles concerning Israel (van Dijk, 1993). CDA is a language-oriented analytical technique 
for identifying patterns of meaning within a data set. It aims to integrate discourse, cognition 
and power, and to bridge the epistemological positions of social constructionism and realism. 
The technique provides insight into how social reality is constructed in talk and text, 
acknowledging the possibilities offered by, and potential constraints imposed by, social 
power relations (van Dijk, 1993). CDA helps reveal the rhetorical strategies for affirming and 
contesting hegemonic and polemic social representations of Israel and indeed how polemic 
representations can be elevated to hegemonic position (Jaspal & Yampolsky, 2011). 
CDA was considered particularly useful due to its theoretical foci, which lie in 
describing (i) control, that is, how groups exert control over others through persuasion or by 
constructing their agenda as ‘natural’; (ii) social cognition, namely that discourse can create 
and feed into social representations; and (ii) rhetorical strategies, namely the ways in which 
stakeholders rationalise and contest particular representations of Israel. These theoretical 
concerns within CDA are crucial for understanding how institutionalised representations 
(associated with the IRI) can become popularised at the social level (Jaspal, in press).  
 
Data collection and procedure 
This study focuses upon two English-language Iranian news outlets, namely The Tehran 
Times and Press TV.   
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 The Tehran Times is a daily newspaper published in both print and online formats. It 
was established by Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti following the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979. According to Behesti, “[t]he Tehran Times is not the newspaper of the government; 
it must be a loud voice of the Islamic Revolution and the loudspeaker of the oppressed people 
of the world”1. Although the newspaper is not state-owned, it aims to disseminate key tenets 
of the Islamic Revolution and is therefore generally supportive of IRI’s ideology. According 
to its website, The Tehran Times ‘makes a special effort to publish reports on cultural and 
religious issues’, in addition to various other social issues. Although there are no independent 
data concerning the circulation of the outlet, The Tehran Times claims to be ‘attracting 
readers from over 80 different countries’ and that its website has ‘over 10,000 visitors each 
day’.  
 Press TV is a state-owned media outlet, which forms part of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Broadcasting Corporation. It was launched in 2007 to ‘counter’ Western news reporting 
on global issues (in particular, the Middle East). The outlet targets the West as its primary 
readership. The official vision statement of Press TV is to ‘to heed the voices and 
perspectives of the people of the world; build bridges of cultural understanding; encourage 
human beings of different nationalities, races and creeds to identify with one another; bring to 
light untold and overlooked stories of individuals who have experienced political and cultural 
divides firsthand.’ Like The Tehran Times, Press TV is similarly conservative in its 
ideological stance, and has been described as a ‘mouth-piece’ for the IRI. 
 Both The Tehran Times and Press TV websites feature an online database of 
published articles, all of which are available in PDF format. Using the keywords ‘Israel’, 
‘Zionist’ and ‘Palestine’, the author conducted a search of the online databases for articles 
published between 1st May 2011 and 1st September 2010. 214 articles published during this 4-
month period contained one or more of these keywords and were included in the output. All 
of these articles were subjected to critical discourse analysis. The aim of the study was to 
provide a fine-grained CDA of the discursive aspects of media reporting on Israel, rather than 
to provide a longitudinal overview of media reporting. The aim was theoretical, focusing on 
how representations are constructed, disseminated and encouraged, rather than purely 
empirical. It was decided that a relatively small and well-circumscribed corpus of articles 
published during a short space of time would be adequate for fulfilling this research aim. 
Moreover, a key aim of the study was to examine habitual ways of media reporting on Israel, 
rather than polarised coverage of particularly contentious events (e.g. Lebanon War; Gaza 
War). Thus, it was deemed appropriate to target a time-period in which there were no reports 
of major social or political events concerning Israel/the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although there 
are frequent skirmishes between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants as well as rocket 
attacks from Gaza, which often feature in international news coverage (Philo & Berry, 2004), 
the aforementioned 4-month period was in fact relatively uneventful.  
 All articles were read repeatedly. The right margin was used to note emerging theme 
titles which captured the qualities of the articles. This procedure was repeated with every 
article. These initial codes included inter alia the general tone of the article, categorisation 
(e.g. ‘regime’), positioning (e.g. victimhood versus perpetrator), particular forms of language 
(e.g. metaphor), and emerging patterns within the data. Subsequently, the right margin was 
used to collate these initial codes into potential discursive themes, which captured the 
essential qualities of the articles analysed. Codes were pieced together in order to create 
discursive themes. The themes were reviewed rigorously against the corpus in order to 
ascertain their compatibility and numerous extracts from the articles were listed against each 
corresponding theme. Specific article extracts, which were considered vivid, compelling and 
representative of the discursive themes, were selected for presentation. Finally, three 
superordinate discursive themes representing the results were developed and ordered into a 
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logical and coherent narrative structure. Relevant constructs from SRT were drawn upon as a 
means of theoretically enriching the analysis. 
 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis discusses the following themes: (i) Resisting social representations of Israeli 
statehood; (ii) Constructing threat: The Zionist regime as a terrorist entity; and (iii) 
Responding to threat: Anti-Zionism as a religious duty for the Muslim Ummah. 
 
Resisting social representations of Israeli statehood 
The IRI regularly contests the legitimacy of the State of Israel, evidenced by the disparaging 
ways in which it refers to the Jewish State in political discourse (Shahvar, 2009). Similarly, 
there was a clear tendency in the corpus to resist social representations of Israeli statehood, 
by conversely constructing Israel in terms of a ‘regime’: 
 
1. The IAEO [International Atomatic Energy Organisation] chief said that the 
Zionist regime’s agents carried out the terror plot with the help of the US and 
UK spying agencies2 
 
2. The Tel Aviv regime has ordered the Israeli navy to use all possible means to 
prevent the incoming international aid flotilla from reaching the Gaza Strip3 
 
3. Yet Tel Aviv...continues to accuse the European governments of negligence in 
backing the Hebrew regime4 
 
The category ‘regime’ has negative connotations of an authoritarian form of government and, 
thus, its use here serves to further negativise Israel. Use of this category is consistent across 
the whole corpus of articles, although it is characterised differentially in terms of the ‘Zionist, 
‘Tel Aviv’, ‘Hebrew’ or ‘Israeli’ regime. The use of ‘Zionist regime’ in extract 1 seems to 
further anchor this ‘authoritarian regime’ to a political ideology which itself has acquired 
negative connotations (Takeyh, 2006). Indeed, the political ideology of Zionism is frequently 
represented in negative terms as an ‘expansionist’ colonial ideology, rather than as the 
politico-national aspiration of the Jewish people (Litvak, 2006).  
 Extract 2 refers to the ‘Tel Aviv regime’ and thereby constructs the city of Tel Aviv 
as the centre of the ‘authoritarian’ regime, despite the fact that Jerusalem is the political 
capital of Israel and the location of the Israeli Knesset (Parliament). This serves to distance 
the ‘regime’ from the city of Jerusalem, which the IRI regards as Islamic territory and refers 
to by its Arabic name ‘Al-Qods’ (Tayekh, 2006; see extract 20). Similarly, the designation of 
Israel as ‘the the Hebrew regime’, as in extract 3, delegitimises the Jewish administration of 
Israel, by characterising it as a ‘regime’. Indeed, the IRI has repeatedly manifested its view 
that Palestine is in fact ‘Muslim land’ and that the Jewish population of Israel is illegitimate 
(Shahvar, 2009). 
 The articles further resist social representations of statehood by referring to Israelis as 
‘Zionists’, rather than as citizens of the State of Israel. 
 
4. The Zionists are worried about the grass-roots uprisings in the Middle East5 
 
In both political and media discourses, the category ‘Zionist’ is commonly employed to 
substitute the demonym ‘Israeli’, which serves to anchor the seldom-mentioned people 
of Israel to the political ideology of Zionism. (It is noteworthy that the articles seldom 
made reference to the people of Israel.) Thus, the citizens of Israel are depicted 
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primarily as adherents of the stigmatised political ideology of Zionism. This contributes 
to the ‘politicisation’ of the people of Israel, since their identities as both individuals 
and citizens of the State of Israel are completely attenuated vis-à-vis their constructed 
affiliation and adherence to the political ideology of Zionism. The ‘politicisation’ of the 
Israeli people foregrounds the ‘regime’, rather than the citizenry, that is, the Israeli 
people. In short, Israel is not represented as a legitimate state at all but rather as a 
‘regime’, whose members are ‘Zionists’, not Israelis. This serves to rhetorically ‘de-
populate’ the State of Israel, objectifying the ‘Zionist entity’ as a malevolent ‘regime’ 
rather than a people consisting of human beings (Klein, 2009). 
 Although the ‘regime’ is most frequently characterised as a ‘Zionist’ one, some 
articles in the corpus did in fact make reference to ‘Israel’ and its demonym ‘Israeli’: 
 
5. Although Tel Aviv had previously prepared itself for hostilities, the Israeli 
regime was forced into starting the conflict6 
 
Clearly, use of the demonym ‘Israeli’ does not at all serve to legitimise the State of Israel, 
although this may appear to constitute a departure from the IRI’s insistence on referring to 
the Jewish State as a ‘regime’ and ‘Occupied Palestine’ (Küntzel, 2010). Rather, it continues 
to construct Israel primarily in terms of a ‘regime’ and only acknowledges Israel insofar as 
this is the name given by the ‘occupiers’ to their regime. Crucially, when the category Israel 
is mentioned, it is habitually accompanied by imagery of occupation and even genocide (see 
extract 11), establishing social representational linkage between the category ‘Israeli’ and 
negative imagery of occupation and genocide (against the Palestinians).  
 Indeed, many articles in the corpus refer to an Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, 
although it is sometimes unclear whether ‘occupied territory’ refers to the West Bank (which 
indeed is recognised by the UN as an occupation) or to the State of Israel (which the IRI 
regards as ‘Occupied Palestine’). However, the following extract clearly represents the entire 
State of Israel as ‘Occupied Palestine’. 
  
6. The recent massive demonstrations in occupied Palestine are regarded as 
public protest against the economic situation and unemployment7 
 
Referring to the widespread protests against the rising costs of living in Israel, the 
extract expresses Israeli public protest against a domestic issue as ‘demonstrations in 
occupied Palestine’. The newspapers consistently resist social representations of 
statehood and thereby downplay the existence of the people of Israel vis-à-vis the 
‘Zionist regime’. When citizens of Israel are mentioned, they tend to be politicised in 
terms of ‘Zionists’ (see extract 4). Yet, this particular article does refer to the popular 
protests of the Israeli people, which gives rise to a tension between the dominant 
tendency to resist social representations of Israel as a state with its own citizenry, on the 
one hand, and acknowledging the reality that Israeli citizens exist, live in Israel and 
participated in public protests against their government. However, it seems that this 
story is covered in accordance with the dominant ideology of the IRI, which officially 
regards the whole State of Israel as ‘Occupied Palestine’, by anchoring the Israeli 
protestors to occupation and colonialism. Although the extract acknowledges that this 
constitutes a case of ‘public protest’, the public itself is positioned within ‘occupied 
Palestine’, rather than in their ‘own’ state. This represents the people of Israeli as 
occupiers, rather than legitimate citizens. One interpretation of this discourse is that the 
power of the regime is decreasing given its alleged ‘internal problems’.8 
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 In addition to the particular categories employed in order to refer to the State of Israel, 
articles objectified the ‘regime’ in terms of a tangible, malevolent and threatening entity. 
 
7. The regime is a cancerous tumor that will metastasize if even a small part of it 
remains on Palestinian soil9 
 
It has been shown that the political rhetoric in the IRI tends to construct the State of Israel in 
terms of a threat to the IRI, to Muslims and even to the West (Jaspal, in press). Extract 3 
draws upon imagery of threat by objectifying the State of Israel in terms of a ‘cancerous 
tumor’. Objectification in this way serves to construct what is already represented as an 
authoritarian ‘regime’ as a growing threat in need of immediate attention. The metaphor of a 
‘cancerous tumor’ is effective in creating a sense of mortal threat, on the one hand, since 
cancerous tumours actively undermine human life, as well as a sense of urgency, given the 
proclivity of malignant tumours to metastasize, posing a more dire threat to the victim. 
Incidentally, the extract explicitly employs the verb ‘metastasize’, which forms part of the 
semantic field of cancer.  
Crucially, ‘the regime’ is constructed in terms of an inanimate, dehumanised entity 
which actively poses a mortal threat to its host, namely the Palestinians. Here too 
stereotypical power differentials between the Israelis and Palestinians are reproduced in order 
to construct Israel as an authoritarian, malevolent regime, on the one hand, and the 
Palestinians as the eternal victims of this mortal threat, on the other. Anchoring Israel to 
malevolence and threat, and the Palestinians to the category of victimhood, reproduces these 
stereotypical power relations. Furthermore, the objectification of Israel in terms of an 
inanimate, yet authoritarian entity represents it as threatening and utterly devoid of humanity. 
The processes of anchoring and objectification collectively serve to encourage some form of 
action against the ‘regime’. Similarly, Jaspal (in press) has argued that political rhetoric in the 
IRI frequently represents Israel as a ‘hybridised’, multi-faceted threat, with the aim of 
mobilising the Islamic Ummah against the State of Israel. 
 
Constructing threat: The Zionist Regime as a terrorist entity 
Articles in the corpus represent Israel as a threat by anchoring it to terrorism. Anchoring 
performs an attributional function by constructing the ‘Zionist regime’ as responsible for 
domestic ‘terrorist attacks’ in the absence of any legal evidence (Moscovici & Hewstone, 
1983). 
 
8. MP Kazem Jalali of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy 
Committee has also said that the assassination was an indiscriminate terrorist 
operation, adding that the Iranian nation knows that the Zionist regime...is 
behind these terrorist attacks...The Zionist regime and the U.S. are the axis of 
terrorism in the world10 
 
The assassination of the Iranian nuclear scientist is described in terms of an ‘indiscriminate 
terrorist operation’, which represents Israel as a threat with the intention to harm 
indiscriminately the Iranian nation, rather than to assassinate one particular individual. This 
performs a ‘collectivising’ function in that the assassination of one individual is constructed 
as threatening to the entire nation (Jaspal & Nerlich, in press). Moreover, this event is 
invoked in order to argue that the ‘Zionist regime (and the US)’ are ‘the axis of terrorism in 
the world’. In short, Israel is represented as leading global terrorism. 
 In the absence of any objective evidence to link Israel to the assassination, the article 
attributes this accusation to the political figure MP Kazem Jalali, whose membership in a 
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security and foreign policy governmental organisation is emphasised. This lends the speaker 
a degree of credibility in the eyes of the reader, which in turn lends credibility to his 
statement of Israel’s culpability. This rhetorical technique of disseminating a social 
representation through the quotation of a ‘socially powerful’ source has been referred to as 
strategic quoting (Jaspal, 2011). Indeed, ‘powerful’ individuals such as politicians and 
‘experts’ usually have greater clout in disseminating social representations (Breakwell, 2001). 
This polemic representation is further reiterated not only through the strategic quoting of an 
‘expert’ by also by constructing this knowledge as commonsensical. The ‘Iranian nation’, that 
is, the people of Iran, are said to be aware of the culpability of the ‘the Zionist regime’. Thus, 
this polemic representation is hegemonised through its attribution to the general population, 
rather than to the Iranian government. 
 Furthermore, even before the trial of the suspect arrested in connection with the 
assassination, articles in the corpus construct the implication of Israel in the ‘terrorist attacks’ 
as imminent and certain. This ‘knowledge’ is constructed as commonsensical: 
 
9. The trial [of Ali Jamali-Fashi who was accused of assassinating a nuclear 
physicist] will shed light on the Zionist regime’s involvement in terrorist 
attacks against the Iranian people11 
 
Use of the future tense ‘will’, rather than the more tentative auxiliary verb ‘may’, further 
hegemonises the representation. The extract clearly represents the ‘Zionist regime’ as a 
terrorist entity by constructing its alleged involvement in the assassination as an act of terror 
against the Iranian people, rather than against the Iranian nuclear programme, the 
government or a particular individual. Thus, the threat is collectivised to the entire nation 
(Jaspal & Nerlich, in press). This polemic representation is juxtaposed with and supported by 
the more established representation (in the Arab world) of Israeli ‘terrorist action’ against the 
Palestinian people: 
 
10. The Zionist regime’s terrorist action against the defenseless and innocent 
Palestinians was an attempt to shift focus away from its internal problems just 
ahead of the International Qods Day12 
 
Extract 10 makes clear reference to the hegemonic representation that the stateless 
Palestinians are ‘defenseless and innocent’ (the constructed victims of the ‘Zionist regime’) 
in order to represent Israel as a terrorist entity. Not only does the ‘Zionist regime’ engage in 
terrorist action but it does so against a ‘defenseless’ people. The ‘de-populated’ and 
dehumanised ‘Zionist regime’ is positioned as the aggressor, while the Palestinians are 
positioned as their victims. In short, the observations that Israel launches attacks against the 
‘Iranian nation’ and the ‘defenseless and innocent Palestinians’ contribute to the overarching 
representation that Israel is a brutal terrorist entity. As exemplified by extract 10, articles 
elaborated this representation by alluding to the reasons allegedly underlying this ‘terrorist 
action’; this is frequently attributed to Israel’s desire to ‘shift focus away from its internal 
problems’. Thus, while the articles represent Israel as a threat and terrorist entity, it is 
simultaneously implied that Israel is inherently weak and on the verge of destruction due to 
its ‘illegitimacy’ (Jaspal, in press).  
 As mentioned, there is an existing hegemonic representation of the plight of the 
Palestinians, which is observable in the global media (Litvak, 2006). Articles in the corpus 
juxtapose this hegemonic representation of Palestinian suffering with the polemic 
representation that Israel actively and malevolently commits atrocities and terrorist acts. This 
too contributes to the representation of Israel as a terrorist entity: 
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11. The bodies of “more than 350” Palestinians killed by Israel in the past 64 
years still remain in Israel’s Cemetery of Numbers, which is described as 
“mass graves for Palestinians”13 
 
12. Another [Turkish] demonstrator said, “We see Maccabi Tel Aviv [football 
team] a representative of Israel that is responsible of massacres in Gaza and at 
the Mavi Mamara”14 
 
In extract 11, there is a clear focus upon the Palestinian people, rather than Palestinian 
militants or combatants. This ambiguity in categorisation constructs the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict as one between the State of Israel and the people of Palestine. Moreover, the 
characterisation of the Palestinian cemetery as ‘mass graves for Palestinians’ serves to depict 
Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people. The term ‘mass graves’ evokes 
imagery of genocide. Similarly, in extract 12, a Turkish protestor is strategically quoted as 
constructing Israeli military action both during the Gaza War and in the Turkish Flotilla 
incident in terms of ‘massacres’. The metaphor of ‘massacre’ indeed forms part of the 
semantic field of genocide. The strategic quoting of a Turkish protestor serves to hegemonise 
this polemic representation, since this is constructed as ‘common knowledge’ shared not only 
by Iranians and Palestinians but also by Turks. The fact that Turkey is usually considered to 
be an ally of Israel, makes the quoting of a Turkish critic of Israel particularly ‘strategic’ 
(Jaspal, 2011).   
 In one article, the political ideology of Zionism, which dominates imagery of Israel in 
Iranian political and media representations, is more explicitly anchored to terrorism, further 
constructing the ‘Zionist regime’ as a terrorist entity: 
 
13. Norway mass killer is pro-Zionist...Anders Behring Breivik, who killed at 
least 93 people in a bomb attack and shooting rampage in Norway, has 
claimed he is pro-Zionist15 
 
These outlets very scantily covered the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Norway. In extract 13, 
these attacks are implicitly attributed to the (irrelevant) political ideology of Zionism. Indeed, 
van Dijk (1993) discusses the rhetorical strategy of ‘overcompleteness/  irrelevance’, 
whereby newspaper discourse provides subordinate, yet superfluous information of little 
relevance to the report itself, in order to confirm and contribute to negative social 
representations of the stigmatised ‘Other’. Breivik has most commonly been associated with 
extreme right-wing extremism and ultra-nationalism (Blair, 2012). However, these ideologies 
are not mentioned in the article. Rather, Zionism is given centre stage, which implies that his 
adherence to this political ideology may somehow explain his ‘bomb attack and shooting 
rampage’. The categories ‘terrorist’/ ‘mass killer’ and ‘pro-Zionist’ are rhetorically entwined, 
establishing social representational linkage between them. This contributes to the social 
representation that Israel is a terrorist entity by ‘normalising’ the links between these practice 
of mass killing and the ideology of Zionism. This polemic representation must be examined 
within the context of existing social representations that Israel has perpetrated deadly attacks 
against the Palestinians, resulting in ‘massacres’ (see extract 12; Litvak, 2006). In short, 
Breivik’s ‘pro-Zionist’ stance is implicitly constructed as the underlying cause of his terrorist 
actions. 
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Responding to threat: Anti-Zionism as a religious duty for the Muslim Ummah 
 Articles in the corpus construct Israel as a ‘hybridised’ threat to Islam, that is, one which 
threatens the Islamic ‘worldview’ as well as the survival of Muslims (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 
2010): 
 
14. Israelis burn mosque, Qur’ans...Numerous copies of the holy Qur’an were also 
burnt16  
 
15. The Israeli regime has demolished a mosque near Tubas in the West 
Bank...This is the third mosque demolished by forces of the Israeli regime17  
 
16. Sadr [Second Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament] added that the Zionist 
regime is spending massively to instigate turmoil and insecurity in Muslim Syria18 
 
Extract 14 attributes arson attacks against a mosque to ‘Israelis’ in general, rather than to any 
particular subgroup, such as Jewish settlers in the West Bank, for instance. This is analogous 
to the observation that Western newspapers frequently attribute global terrorism to Muslims 
in general (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010), which can anchor Islam to terrorism (Cinnirella, 
2012). In this case, the national category ‘Israeli’ is anchored to attacks against Muslims. 
Having attributed these attacks to Israelis in general, the article proceeds to explain that the 
Islamic Qur’an was also burnt. Similarly, extract 15 further constructs ‘the Israeli regime’ as 
a threat to Islam by highlighting a series of Israeli-led demolitions. Use of the verb ‘raze’ in 
the title of the article constructs this as a complete destruction, further accentuating the threat 
allegedly posed by the ‘Israeli regime’. The acts of burning and destroying Islamic places of 
worship and the Islamic Holy Book construct the seldom-mentioned Israeli people, as well as 
the ‘Israeli regime’, as posing a hybridised threat to Islam. Extract 16 depicts the ‘Zionist 
regime’ as resourceful in its attempt to ‘instigate turmoil and insecurity’ in Muslim land. This 
is consistent with the representation that the ‘Zionist regime’ is malevolent and committed to 
the destruction of Islam (Klein, 2009). Crucially, this is constructed as Zionist aggression 
against a Muslim country, which represents Israel as a threat to Muslims. 
 Articles explicitly link the social representation that Israel constitutes a hybridised 
threat to Islam with the emancipated representation that Muslims should collectively mobilise 
against Israel: 
 
17. Jalili [Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council] said the 
liberation of Palestine could serve as the unifying point of Islamic Awakening 
movements in different countries and could...restore the rights which have 
been downtrodden by the Zionist regime19 
 
18. [Iran’s Deputy Defence Minister Vahidi stated that]“It seems as if the second 
wave of Islamic Awakening in...the fight against the Zionist regime (of Israel) 
is starting to reveal itself...This awakening will remove all obstacles from its 
way, and this anti-Zionist wake will take form in other Muslim countries”20 
 
Although extract 17 refers to the injustices allegedly perpetrated by Israel in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the implications of these injustices are generalised to the Islamic 
Ummah. The extract constructs the ‘Zionist regime’ as deliberately curtailing the rights of the 
Palestinians, which reiterates the threatening nature of Israel. Given that Iranian political 
rhetoric frequently accentuates its superordinate self-categorisation as Muslims, injustices 
against the Palestinians are constructed as similarly relevant to the Iranian nation (see also 
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extract 19). Crucially, social action against the ‘tyranny’ of Israel and, more specifically, ‘the 
liberation of Palestine’ are represented as the ‘unifying point of the Islamic Awakening’, that 
is, an ideological bridge between the global Muslim Ummah (Jaspal, in press). Both extracts 
17 and 18 describe what has been referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’ as the ‘Islamic 
Awakening’, that is, they seem to Islamicise the Arab Spring. In short, mobilisation against 
Israel and commitment to its destruction (implied by the ‘liberation of Palestine) are 
constructed as a pan-Islamic ‘duty’. Similarly, in extract 18, the struggle against the ‘Zionist 
regime’ is depicted as central to the aforementioned ‘Islamic Awakening’. Anti-Zionism is 
Islamicised by anchoring it to the Arab Spring (or ‘Islamic Awakening’). More specifically, 
the extract represents anti-Zionism as the global and imminent product of the Islamic 
Awakening and thereby constructs it as a religious duty for Muslims. 
 The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance is strategically quoted in order to 
represent the issue of Palestine as a key Islamic concern: 
 
19. Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has released a multimedia CD 
on Zionism in Tehran... “Palestine is the main issue of the Islamic world and 
we could not be indifferent to the 60 years of tyranny perpetrated by the 
Zionists,” Hosseini [the Iranian Culture Minister] mentioned.21 
 
The fact that this particular governmental department has released a CD on Zionism is telling 
– it is constructed as a cultural and, more specifically, an Islamic concern. Moreover, the 
Culture Minister is strategically quoted as referring to Palestine as ‘the main issue of the 
Islamic world’ and as urging Muslims to exhibit concern for the Palestinian cause. The social 
representation that the ‘Zionists’ pose a tyrannical threat to the Palestinians and Muslims, 
more generally, is strategically invoked in order to construct the emancipated representation 
that anti-Zionism is a religious ‘duty’. The strategic quote depicts anti-Zionism as a core self-
aspect associated with Islam. 
 Several articles in the corpus rhetorically accentuate the anti-Zionist tenet of Islam by 
highlighting the engagement of ‘Muslim nations’ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 
 
20. Muslim nations are now more determined than ever in their efforts to liberate 
all of the occupied territories, including occupied holy Qods...International 
Qods Day is a day of solidarity with Palestine observed on the last Friday of 
the holy month of Ramadan.22 
 
21. Ramadan is one of the means for solidarity among Muslims... we should 
remember that the Zionist Regime and the United States are the common 
enemies of all Muslims.23 
 
Extract 20 constructs anti-Zionism as a Muslim duty. This process of ‘liberating’ Palestine is 
optimistically represented as being already under way. In extract 20, the need to ‘liberate’ 
Palestine is clearly anchored to Islamic duty through the ‘overcompleteness/ irrelevance’ 
rhetorical strategy; the ‘day of solidarity’ is constructed as an Islamic duty through its 
anchoring to the ‘holy month of Ramadan’. Similarly, extract 21 explicitly represents anti-
Zionism as a common self-aspect of Islam by designating the ‘Zionist regime’ as a ‘common’ 
enemy of Muslims. The dictum regarding Muslim solidarity implies that it is necessary for all 
Muslims to espouse anti-Zionism in order to maintain a unified Islamic stance. In short, these 
articles represent anti-Zionism as a necessary religious duty for the global Islamic Ummah. 
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DISCUSSION 
This paper makes a novel socio-psychological contribution to the debate concerning IRI-led 
anti-Zionism by providing a social representations analysis of two English-language Iranian 
Press outlets. Through the rhetorical techniques of (i) providing ‘overcomplete’ superfluous 
information, (ii) strategic quoting and (iii) anchoring emerging polemic representations to 
well-established hegemonic ones, these outlets construct, disseminate and encourage negative 
social representations of Israel. Consistent with the ideology of the IRI, they adopt an 
unequivocally anti-Zionist stance and present Israel in terms of a ‘regime’, a global terrorist 
threat, as well as the central concern of the Islamic Ummah. 
  
Social representations of Israel 
Social categorisation facilitates the construction of ingroup/outgroup social identities, 
maintains their delineation, and imbues the groups with valence (Tajfel, 1981). The two 
outlets resist social representations of Israeli statehood, which serves to delegitimise the 
existence of the State of Israel. Moreover, there is no acknowledgement of Israel’s civilian 
population, which leads to a rhetorical ‘de-population’ of Israel. Instead, the category of 
‘regime’ politicises the civilian population. In some articles, the government and the people 
are collectively referred to as ‘Zionists’, rather than in terms of their (Israeli) citizenship, 
which similarly serves to anchor them primarily to the political ideology of Zionism. Zionism 
itself is largely stigmatised in Arab, Muslim and even some Western contexts, given that it is 
frequently anchored to racism and Nazism (Takeyh, 2006). Incidentally, articles further 
negativise Zionism by anchoring it to the terrorist actions of the Norwegian mass murderer 
Anders Breivik, who was convicted of killing 77 individuals in shooting and bombing 
campaigns. These forms of categorisation essentially reinforce a social representation, which 
is hegemonic in Muslim Middle Eastern societies, that Israel is an illegitimate ‘regime’ in 
‘Occupied Palestine’ (Webman, 2010). 
 Articles actively draw upon threat imagery. The inanimate, non-human ‘Zionist 
regime’ is represented as espousing terrorism, thereby appearing to pose a ‘hybridised’ threat 
to the ingroup (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). Anchoring Israel to terrorism performs an 
attributional function, since this ‘evil Other’ is hastily represented as a scapegoat (Lewis, 
2003). By anchoring ‘Zionist terror’ against the Iranian people to the ‘Zionist genocide’ of 
the Palestinian people, the articles create an atmosphere of suspicion of the ‘Zionist Other’, 
since individuals are encouraged to transfer knowledge of ‘Palestinian suffering’ to other 
groups. The ‘Zionist threat’ is thereby constructed as global (Webman, 2010). Crucially, the 
social representation that the ‘Zionist regime’ is a terrorist entity, which actively seeks to 
harm Iranians and Muslims, more generally, performs a collectivising function, therefore 
encouraging collective mobilisation against Israel. 
 Although the English-language Iranian Press is keen to differentiate between anti-
Zionism and anti-Semitism, while actively espousing an anti-Zionist position, the IRI’s 
stance in fact seems to be ‘religiously defined, as a struggle between a pristine Islamic 
cilivization and a blasphemous Zionist creed’ (Takeyh, 2006, p. 84). Similarly, articles in the 
corpus represent the conflict as a key Islamic concern by anchoring it to Islamic occasions for 
‘solidarity’ such as Ramadan, the International Qods Day and more recently the ‘Islamic 
Awakening’ (that is, the Arab Spring). It comes to dominate these collective aspects of Islam, 
establishing itself as a key tenet of religious participation. Crucially, this is facilitated by 
constructing Israel as a hybridised threat to Islam – individuals typically worry about the 
well-being and continuity of their immediate ingroups (Cohen, 2001). Anti-Zionist is 
implicitly constructed as a ‘duty’ for the Muslim Ummah. Consequently, indifference to the 
Israeli-Arab conflict is made to appear ‘un-Islamic’. 
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Psychological motives and social action 
The link between social representation and social cognition is of crucial importance (van 
Dijk, 1993). Bernard Lewis (2003, p. 93) has argued that ‘Israel serves as a useful stand-in 
for complaints about the economic privation and political repression under which most 
Muslim peoples live’ and that anti-Zionism may constitute a means of ‘deflecting the 
resulting anger’. Moreover, it has been argued that media representational strategies may 
reflect broader socio-psychological motives (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010). In explaining the 
anti-Zionist stance of the IRI, Jaspal (in press) has suggested that this stance may help to 
establish (i) a sense of belonging in the predominantly Sunni Muslim Middle East, (ii) 
feelings of self-efficacy vis-à-vis Israel (and the Jews) and (iii) a sense of continuity over 
time. Indeed, it is easy to see how the media’s representation of Israel as a common concern 
for the Islamic Ummah and the accentuation of Iran’s role in uniting the global Islamic 
Ummah’s in this common concern could promote feelings of ingroup belonging and self-
efficacy (competence and control), respectively. 
 Moreover, there may be a desire for establishing acceptance, inclusion and belonging 
in the broader global context, that is, the West, which is often critical of the IRI’s 
demonisation of Israel and Jews (Takeyh, 2006). As a ‘mouth-piece’ of the IRI, these outlets 
seek to export its ideology beyond the borders of Iran in a socially acceptable manner. 
Clearly, the frequent overtly anti-Semitic diatribes of the Iranian leadership (Shahvar, 2009) 
would likely be deemed inappropriate by much of the intended Western readership of these 
English-language outlets. The implicit aim of these outlets may be to further rationalise the 
anti-Zionist stance, upon which the IRI depends (Jaspal, in press), by anchoring the ‘regime’ 
to threat and terror and by objectifying it in terms of a harmful ‘cancer’. Although it may be 
tempting to underestimate the clout of these outlets in encouraging fervent anti-Zionism 
beyond the borders of Iran, some groups in society may be particularly vulnerable to the 
delegitimising social representations disseminated by these outlets. For instance, media 
research with British Muslims has shown that this group may distrust the mainstream British 
Press due to the perception that it is ‘biased’ (Jaspal, 2011). This may lead disaffected 
Muslims to explore alternative news outlets such as The Tehran Times and Press TV, which 
promise to be “the loudspeaker of the oppressed people of the world”. Social representations 
disseminated by these outlets may be uncritically accepted by sections of the British Muslim 
community. In an important study of anti-Semitism among young British Muslims, Jiheli 
(2009) found that participants generally associated enmity with Jews with their Muslim 
identity and that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict served as a key rationale for their anti-
Semitism. Consequently, the fervent anti-Zionism embodied in Iranian media representations 
could further fan the flames of anti-Semitism among disaffected Muslim youth. 
 In linking social representations and social action, it seems appropriate to recall that 
‘[w]hen people believe firmly that they are on the side of good and are working to make the 
world a better place, they often feel justified in using strong measures against the seemingly 
evil forces that oppose them’ (Baumeister, 1997, p. 377). Crucially, articles consistently 
construct Israel as a malevolent, oppressive, terrorist ‘regime’ which is antithetical to the 
values of Islam. They represent mobilisation against Israel as a necessary duty for ‘good’ 
Muslims. Moreover, the ‘regime’ is rhetorically dehumanised and ‘de-populated’, thereby 
obscuring the civilian population of Israel. Kelman (1976) states that dehumanisation serves 
to deprive individuals of agentic and collective aspects of humanness, which can result in 
their failure to evoke compassion among perpetrators of abuse and violence. Accordingly, 
dehumanised victims are seldom shown any mercy. Thus, dehumanising and demonising 
social representations may serve to construct Israelis (and perhaps Jews in general, Jiheli, 
2009) as a legitimate target for discrimination, abuse and even violence. The implications for 
intergroup relations could be devastating. This in turn is likely to encourage defensive 
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responses from both the Israeli government and society, which are characterised by a ‘siege 
mentality’ whereby the Jewish Israeli ingroup is perceived to be perpetually threatened by 
outgroups (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper describes how social representations are created, disseminated and encouraged in 
a small sample of English-language Iranian Press articles. As a ‘mouth-piece’ of the IRI, 
these articles adopt and encourage a fervently anti-Zionist stance by refusing to recognise the 
statehood and civilian population of Israel and by constructing the ‘Zionist regime’ as a 
terrorist threat which should be mitigated collectively by the Islamic Ummah. This 
inflammatory rhetoric is exported to a Western readership in order to globalise the anti-
Zionist ideology of the IRI, which could lead to irrational delegitimisation of the State of 
Israel, increased anti-Semitism, negative intergroup relations and an accentuation of the 
Israeli ‘siege mentality’. It is hoped that this paper will draw attention to the pressing socio-
psychological concern of anti-Zionism. 
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